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Abstract
First, the government restrictions found in the Protective Order and the new regulations severely
limit the amount of contact the attorney can have with the client and the type of information that
can be shared with the client. Second, the stay of the court proceedings since December 2004 has
prevented any opportunity to present issues in the courts. Third, cultural barriers between attor-
neys and clients, including but not limited to the clients’ inability to understand the rule of law and
the role of lawyers in the Common Law adversary model in general, and in the U.S. legal system
in particular, further inhibit their decision-making capacity. This Essay considers the role of the
defense attorney in Guantanamo Bay. Part I looks at models of cause lawyering, compares the
tactics used by radical attorneys to those used by Guantanamo defense attorneys, and considers
the rule of law as a “cause.” Part II looks to the restrictions put on the attorney-client relation-
ship by the U.S. government and the client’s diminished decision-making capacity, and argues that
paternalism is allowed in the relationship by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Part III
considers the cultural gap that inhibits attorney client relationship in addition to the other barriers
that were presented.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers for Guantanamo detainees seek to assert the rule of
law on behalf of their clients. However, few can have a client-
centered, client-autonomous relationship because of the restric-
tions imposed by the government. Litigation has been denied
and/or stayed almost since its inception, and cultural differ-
ences between lawyers and most of the clients make representa-
tion more difficult. As a result, the lawyers of the Guantanamo
detainees represent their clients the way "cause" lawyers repre-
sented their clients during the legal and social turmoil of the
1960s. There are two differences for lawyers for Guantanamo
detainees. First, the cause is not controversial since it is the rule
of law. The other difference is that the client centered auton-
omy is scarce and the paternal role of the lawyer at its zenith.
There are certain principles upon which this Essay rests:
" The relationship between attorney and client is one of in-
equality.
" The degree of inequality varies, but the relationship is
one of client dependence.
" There are always conflicts between the lawyer's interests
and the interests of the client.'
" The law regulates the boundaries of the attorney-client re-
lationship and the process of decision making.
* Mark Denbeaux, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law;J.D. New
York University School of Law, 1968; B.A. College of Wooster, 1965. Christa Boyd-Naf-
stad, J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law, 2007 (expected) (cum laude); B.A. Uni-
versity of North Texas, 2000 (cum laude); A.S. Grayson County College, 1998 (cum
laude). Thanks to Professor Mark Denbeaux for all his support, and special thanks to
Karl Boyd-Nafstad for everything.
1. If for no other reasons, the attorneys are working for the client but they expect
the client to pay for the services that they provide.
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* The manner and substance of the regulation of the attor-
ney-client relationship is controversial.
While there are many models, the polar alternatives are be-
tween the client-centered and the attorney-centered (paternal)
models. The attorney-centered model assumes that the attorney
knows best and accepts the role of the attorney's use of power as
paternal. The client-centered model assumes that the client
knows best and encourages the maximum autonomy for the de-
pendent client.
The paternal model is often associated with attorneys who
have an agenda that may be larger than one particular client.
Such relationships are often characterized as "cause" or public-
interest lawyering. The literature expounding on these relation-
ships is rich and comprehensive. Paternal lawyering encom-
passes lawyers trying to change the system in some fundamental
way and has a long history in our legal system. The client cen-
tered model, on the other hand, is free from any paternalism
because the lawyer has no agenda greater than that of his client
and the representation is centered on the client and nothing
else. Paternal cause lawyering has been associated with the law-
yers and the causes of the 19 60s and 19 70s, though its history
pre-dates the Civil War.
The lawyers representing the detainees in Guantanamo are
providing services similar to those of other public-interest cause
lawyering. The cause driving the Guantanamo attorney-client re-
lationship is different only because the cause is less social change
than the assertion of the rule of law and the role of lawyers,
which are not usually thought of as a "cause" in the same sense
as other political causes or public interest lawyering.
In non-democratic countries the rule of law is a cause that
lawyers fight for using tactics from litigation to media to protest,
and for which many lawyers end up in jail or harassed in other
ways. The Guantanamo defense attorneys started out using liti-
gation as their main tool, and, when denied access to the courts
and to their clients, turned to other methods of lawyering that
are very similar to those used by cause lawyers in third world
countries and by members of the bar in the United States in the
1960s and 1970s.
Another difference between cause lawyering models and
the present situation is that the former assumes that clients have
[Vol. 30:491
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some opportunity to assert their interests and a forum in which
to assert them. They assume a lawyer working in collaboration
with a client to achieve the lawyer's cause and the client's goals.
In Guantanamo Bay, paternalism has been very broadly ap-
plied. Indeed, paternalism has overwhelmed the normal role of
client autonomy or even client participation. Guantanamo law-
yers have planned their litigation strategies without consulting
their clients and have had to make decisions on behalf of their
clients using only their best judgment, and some have even ig-
nored sporadic, ambivalently expressed dismissals by their cli-
ents.
2
The minimal role for client autonomy and client participa-
tion does not arise as a result of choice by counsel. Three con-
ditions cause the enhanced paternalism.
First, the government restrictions found in the Protective
Order and the new regulations severely limit the amount of con-
tact the attorney can have with the client and the type of infor-
mation that can be shared with the client.
Second, the stay of the court proceedings since December
2004 has prevented any opportunity to present issues in the
courts.
Third, cultural barriers between attorneys and clients, in-
cluding but not limited to the clients' inability to understand the
rule of law and the role of lawyers in the Common Law adversary
model in general, and in the U.S. legal system in particular, fur-
ther inhibit their decision-making capacity.
3
This Essay considers the role of the defense attorney in
Guantanamo Bay. Part I looks at models of cause lawyering,
compares the tactics used by radical attorneys to those used by
Guantanamo defense attorneys, and considers the rule of law as
a "cause." Part II looks to the restrictions put on the attorney-
client relationship by the U.S. government and the client's di-
minished decision-making capacity, and argues that paternalism
is allowed in the relationship by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Part III considers the cultural gap that inhibits attor-
2. Which usually come interspersed with requests to be represented.
3. Because of these restrictions, the client is similarly situated to the one assumed
in Rule 1.14 of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules, whose capacity to
make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is dimin-
ished. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILYrr R. 1.14 (2002).
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ney client relationship in addition to the other barriers that were
presented.
I. GUANTANAMO BAY ATTORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP:
CLIENT CENTERED OR CAUSE LAWYERING?
A. Client Centered Attorney-Client Relationship
We all know the danger of using courtrooms as political fo-
rums. And it is important to oppose political extremists who
make illegitimate use of our courts.
-John Lindsay, Mayor of New York, speaking on the Abbie
Hoffman trial.4
Since the emergence of the "client-centered" approach to
lawyering made popular in the 1980's by David Binder and Su-
san Price's seminal work;5 the use of paternalism in the law has
fallen out of favor. The American Bar Association's Model Rules
have more or less embraced the theory of the client-centered
approach as a reaction against the so-called political lawyering or
cause lawyering of the 1960s and 1970s.6
Since that time, attorneys representing non-traditional cli-
ents, ranging from grassroots activist groups to aging clients in
estates work, have tried to find ways around this model in theory
and in practice. Others, while not disregarding the "client-cen-
tered" approach altogether, have recognized its shortcomings.
This section will examine the criticisms of the client-cen-
tered model, and look at other models of attorney-client rela-
tionships that have been proposed, then compare these "activist"
models to the current situation facing detainees and defense at-
torneys in Guantanamo Bay, specifically in regards to client free
will and what actions "cause lawyers" take on behalf of their cli-
ents compared with Guantanamo defense attorneys. A discus-
sion of cause lawyering for the rule of law will end the section.
The client that Binder and Price had in mind in their "cli-
ent-centered" approach was a sophisticated individual or corpo-
ration. This client would secure the services of the attorney for
4. THE TALES OF HOFFMAN (Mark L. Levine et al., eds., 1970).
5. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
6. See MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' ETHICS 64-65
(3d ed. 2004).
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the purpose of litigation that would result in the upholding of
the status quo. In Binder and Price's world, the lawyer does not
guide the client to decisions but listens with great sensitivity and
"empathetic understanding" to the client's carefully thought-out
choices. If the client is someone for whom the lawyer has no
empathy, the lawyer is supposed to reflect "feeling in a way that
creates the impression" of empathetic understanding.
7
This theory works best for "clients who enjoy economic lev-
erage over their attorneys, clients whose own expertise rivals
their lawyers' knowledge,"' in short, powerful clients who are not
intimidated by the legal system.
For other clients, the "client-centered" approach leads to
coercion and manipulation by lawyers. Stephen Ellmann, a sup-
portive critic of Binder and Price, points out in his article Lawyers
and Clients that lawyers under this model frequently resort to ma-
nipulation to avoid costly and distressing combat with clients.9
For Ellmann, this manipulation is an automatic feature of the
attorney-client relationship, and is justified when it is in the best
interests of the client, lawyer, or a third-party. l
B. Paternal Attorney-Client Relationship: Cause Lawyering
A recognition that the lawyer is in reality an activist, shaping
the ideas and concepts of bodies of existing law to serve the
needs of the forces that the lawyer represents, was the most
valuable lesson to emerge .... It led me to ask a fundamental
question. If skilled lawyers for the corporations and for the
government understand this fact and function this way in the
interest of their establishment clients, why cannot lawyers for
the people . . .?
-Professor Arthur Kinoy.11
There are many alternative models of attorney-client rela-
tionship for lawyers with clients who are not legally sophisti-
cated. These include the collaborative model, facilitative model,
directive model, activist model, and cause lawyering. Under the
7. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 5, at 34.
8. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 718 (1987).
9. See id. at 762-63.
10. See id. at 761-65 (arguing that client manipulation can be justified as long as it
is in someone's best interests).
11. ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER 47
(1983).
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collaborative model the attorney and client are "friends;" they
make decisions together.12 While the lawyer gives advice to the
client, he does not do it in legal jargon, but in the client's termi-
nology.1 3 The lawyer is encouraged to become part of the cli-
ent's struggle and use non-legal courses of action in solving cli-
ents' problems.14 The facilitative model contemplates the prob-
lem of attorneys working for social change who wish to protect
their clients' autonomy.15 This model is less "self-consciously po-
litical" than the collaborative model, and prescribes a more cir-
cumscribed role for the attorney.' 6 It proposes to maintain cli-
ent autonomy by restricting the lawyer's activities to litigation
and legal strategies only.17 The model thus allows a political
agenda, while prohibiting political action. The directive model
gives the attorney the power to decide moral issues that arise in
representing a client: when professional obligations and moral
obligations conflict, the directive lawyer will pick the moral obli-
gation. This lawyer works for 'justice" and has a long tradition
in American jurisprudence. 8 The activist model contemplates
an attorney who interacts with the client on a "non-hierarchical"
basis using regular speech rather than legal jargon as in the col-
laborative model, and, also as in the collaborative model, es-
pouses a view of the lawyer's work that is more inclusive than
strictly legal work. This model goes farther, however, in advocat-
ing active participation with the clients in planning and imple-
menting non-legal strategy direct action. This model sees the
attorney as an activist organizer.1 9
Finally, cause lawyering as a model encompasses or overlaps
with all previous models. At the heart of this model is the "belief
in a cause and a desire to advance that cause."20 Austin Sarat
and Stuart Scheingold in their 1998 collection of essays on cause
12. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr. et al., Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Respon-
sibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 598-99 (2003).
13. See GERARD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-
GRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
14. See id.
15. See Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 67, 100-01 (2000).
16. See id. at 99.
17. See id. at 101.
18. See Cochran et al., supra note 12, at 594-95.
19. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 15, at 122-23.
20. Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type...: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAw
& Soc. INQUIRY 657, 659 (2004).
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lawyering state that cause lawyering is "everywhere a deviant
strain within the legal profession. 2 1 Cause lawyers choose clients
and cases in order to pursue their own ideological goals; mone-
tary gains are not the motivating factor.2 2 Cause lawyers pursue
their goals through litigation, but this is only one of many strate-
gies. Cause lawyers have been accused of "trying their case in
the media" as many of their strategies revolve around confer-
ences, speeches, and other events that aim at getting media cov-
erage. Some give interviews to the media, while in some cases
the filing of the complaint or the court case itself is designed to
attract media attention.
Our legal history reads like a time-line of cause lawyering.
The Dred Scott23 case in the 1850s was designed to attract media
attention, and it did. Although Scott lost the case, his lawyers
succeeded in sparking a national dialogue about the future of
slavery in the country. Cause lawyers such as Clarence Darrow
and Thurgood Marshall took cases that had little chance of suc-
cess in order to push a larger agenda. Darrow's two most promi-
nent cases were both failures in the courthouse but successes in
the media and infamous among the public24 both because of the
subject matter at hand and because of Darrow's antics in the
courtroom. The Scopes Monkey Trial may be Darrow's most
dramatic example of legal defeat leading to social change.
Marshall succeeded in court for his cause. However, his
cause was not fulfilled until other lawyers and other activists
joined the cause. Brown v. Board of Education, while a legal tri-
umph, was only completed by other cause lawyers and other ac-
tivists. Brown had the same effect as Darrow's losses: engaging
the public in dialogue and creating attention to his cause.
Sometimes complaints were filed when the attorney has no
chance of winning: Arthur Kinoy describes bringing a lawsuit on
behalf of the United Electrical Workers in the 1940s when he
knew the "chances of immediate legal success were virtually non-
21. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Profes-
sional Responsibility, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITIES 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
22. See Hilbink, supra note 20, at 660.
23. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
24. Darrow's two cases were the Haymarket riot case of 1886, and the Scopes Mon-
key Trial of 1925.
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existent."25  The complaint charged certain companies and
members of Congress with conspiracy to violate workers' Consti-
tutional rights. This complaint was handed around like a pam-
phlet, read by all in the plants and town, and gave courage and
strength to the oppressed, but it was thrown out of court.26
In the 1960s and 1970s, the bar association looked unkindly
upon cause lawyers for such organizations as the Students for a
Democratic Society or the Black Panthers. Lawsuits were filed as
"vehicles for gathering information, positioning adversaries, and
asserting bargaining leverage."27 Gary Bellow, in his essay on
"political lawyering" describes a practice that he used as the
faculty of a law school clinic. It was a "focused case" strategy
which, in order to stop tenant evictions, created "eviction-free
zones" and signed up as many clients as possible from those ar-
eas. Once the clinic had clients, they "pressed the cases in ways
that not only sought to preserve tenants' possession of the prop-
erty, but communicated directly to landlords the risk of in-
creased cost and exposure that would accompany efforts... [to
evict tenants]. 28
C. Guantanamo Bay and Cause Lawyering
The Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") began to ac-
tively recruit attorneys to represent detainees, and to sign up de-
tainees who wanted representation. Many of the detainee-clients
were signed up by other detainees as "next of friend." The bar
association took an active part in securing representation for the
detainees. The president of the New York City Bar, Bettling
Plevan, took an active role in recruiting large law firms to re-
present detainees. Some of the largest law firms in the country
signed up to represent detainees;21 many of the firms list their
25. KINOY, supra note 11, at 71.
26. The German Bar Association has followed in the path of Arthur Kinoy in filing
lawsuits that have little to no chance of success. Hannes Honnicker, General Secretary
of the German Bar is leading a group of lawyers in representing former prisoners at
Abu-Graib in charging Donald Rumsfeld with torture. Honnicker says: "[w]e have no
realistic hope of seeing Rumsfeld in court . . . ." NRK Nyheter, Rumsfeld Saksokes i
Tyskland [Rumsfeld Sued in Germany] (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/
utenriks/1.1318816 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
27. Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lauyering, 31
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 300 (1996).
28. Bellow, supra note 27, at 299.
29. For example, Perkins Coie; Shearman & Sterling; Proskauer, Rose; Mayer,
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pro bono work for the detainees on their websites and use the
representation as a recruiting tool for attracting new associates.
The website for Perkins Coie announces that the judge hearing
their habeas case stated that the work they are doing for the de-
tainees is in "the greatest tradition of the bar and the country."3
The purpose of the lawsuit is to make the point that this behav-
ior will not be tolerated in a civil society.
D. Attorney Activities on Behalf of Guantanamo Detainees
While the model of cause lawyering captures the activities
that Guantanamo defense attorneys are employing, it does not
capture the relationship between client and attorney. The cause
lawyering model assumes unrestricted access between attorney
and client, and that the client has something to say and a forum
to say it in. As discussed more thoroughly in the next section,
the clients in Guantanamo Bay have very little access to their law-
yers or chance to participate actively in their representation.
Since the Military Commissions Act was signed, they also have no
forum to hear their complaints. Even before the Act was signed,
no detainee had actually had his habeas case heard in any
court 1
The cause the attorneys are fighting for in this instance is
the rule of law, specifically the autonomy of the attorney and the
sacredness of the attorney-client privilege. While the rule of law
is not viewed as a "cause" in industrialized democracies, in the
dictatorships of the world, the rule of law is the primary "cause"
for cause lawyers. There are over 200 groups in the "third
world" whose main focus is on the rule of law, independence of
judges and lawyers, administration of justice, and legal aid. 2
Speaking from experience in Argentina, Stephen Meili observed
that attorneys practicing "cause lawyers in most authoritarian
Brown, Rowe & Maw; Blank Rome; Manatt, Phelps & Phillips; Allen & Overy; Paul,
Weiss; Hunton & Williams; Holland & Hart; Dorsey & Whitney; and Covington & Burl-
ing all signed up to represent detainees.
30. PERKINS COLE, PRO BONo ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2004), available at http://
www.perkinscoie.com/content/aboutperkins/relatedlinks/2004annual.pdf.
31. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council ("ECOSOC"), Comm. on Human Rights, Report:
Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27,
2006) [hereinafter U.N. Report].
32. This figure is from the 1994 Human Rights Internet Master list (now called
The List): A Listing of Organizations Concerned with Human Rights and Social Justice World-
wide (Ottawa, Human Rights Internet, 1994).
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countries ... have an interest in strengthening the rule of law
and democratic state institutions (including the judiciary)." 3 3
The work of these cause lawyers is inherently political, as it nec-
essarily involves challenging unjust political power.'
For U.S. attorneys committed to the rule of law, the ques-
tion arises: when there is no forum to hear my client's case, and
my client is incapacitated, how do I proceed?
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN
GUANTANAMO BAY
A. Protective Order
The relationship between the attorney and client detained
in Guantanamo Bay is severely limited in two major respects.
First, the Protective Order of 2004 and the new regulations hin-
der the flow of information between attorney and client. Second,
the client has little to no knowledge of the U.S. legal system, and
there is a cultural barrier between the client and the lawyer. Be-
cause of these two phenomena, this section argues that the tradi-
tional approach to lawyering, whether client-centered or cause-
lawyering, is not a viable option; instead, this situation should fit
under the Model Rules provision for a client with diminished
capacity, which allows paternalism on the part of the attorney.
The Protective Order prohibits the attorney from sharing
any classified information with his client.35 Classified informa-
tion refers to anything written or oral that the government has in
its possession or has ever had in its possession that it marks as
classified or tells the attorney is classified;36 this includes most of
the information relating to the facts of the client's detainment
and information necessary to defend the client.
Contrast this with Model Rule 1.4, which mandates that the
33. Stephen Meili, Cause Lawyering for Collective Justice: A Case Study of the Amparo
Colectivo in Argentine, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERs MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN
LEGAL PRACTICE 383, 396 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2005).
34. See Stephen Ellmann, Cause Lauyering in The Third World, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 21, at 349,
369-70.
35. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (D.D.C. 2004)
("Petitioners' counsel shall not disclose classified information not provided by peti-
tioner-detainee to that petitioner-detainee."). See generally Brendan M. Driscoll, Note,
The Guantdnamo Protective Order, 30 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 873 (2007).
36. See id. at 176-77; see also Executive Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315,
15315-18 (Mar. 25, 2003) (describing what qualifies as classified information).
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attorney explain all matters pertaining to the client's legal af-
fairs, and keep the client updated on all matters, in a way that
allows the client to make decisions concerning the representa-
tion. Rule 1.4 also puts a duty on the attorney to keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.38 Attor-
neys cannot easily communicate with their clients; the govern-
ment does not allow access to email for detainees; and the Pro-
tective Order does not allow telephonic communication. Before
the new regulations were enacted, an attorney sending legal mail
under the Protective Order was assured at least a reasonable
amount of privacy, as the system it established allowed the mili-
tary to search incoming legal mail for contraband only, and re-
quired that they forward the mail to the detainee addressee
within two days.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege and Privilege Team
With the new regulations in place as of October, a "privilege
team" will read all mail from the attorney before sending it to
the client. The attorney is not allowed to write about anything
concerning "unnecessary outside information"; if the correspon-
dence contains anything the privilege team deems unnecessary,
the letter will not be forwarded to the client. Not only does this
regulation inhibit meaningful dialogue between attorney and cli-
ent, it also runs afoul of the United Nations Basic Principles on
the Role of Lawyers, which states "[g] overnments shall recognize
and respect that all communications and consultations between
lawyers and their clients within their professional relationship
are confidential. 3 9
After the suicides in Guantanamo in July 2006, the military
confiscated over 1000 pounds of the detainees' correspondence,
including envelopes marked "attorney-client privilege."4" After
the government investigators captured all legal correspondence
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2006) (stating that "[a] lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation").
38. See id.
39. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawryers 22,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/28 (1990).
40. See Evidence of Broader Plot Found in Guantanamo Suicide Investigation, Fox NEWS,
July 9, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,202668,00.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2006).
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between the detainee-clients and their defense attorneys, they
filed a motion in federal district court requesting that a special
"review panel" be set up to review all documents passing between
attorney and client. On September 15, 2006, Judge Robertson
issued a Memorandum Order granting their motion." Judge
Robertson used the deferential Turner test, which was developed
by the Supreme Court in the late 1980s to review Constitutional
rights of prisoners.42 Even under this very deferential test, how-
ever, no court has found that prison authorities have unfettered
access to review prisoners' legal mail. Most courts have found
that legal mail can only be searched for contraband or skimmed
to determine whether it is in fact legal mail, and this must be
done in the presence of the prisoner.43 The Memorandum is-
sued by Judge Robertson encroaches on the attorney-client privi-
lege in a way courts had previously not dared to, even when us-
ing the same standard of review.
44
C. Access to Clients
Another alternative to keep the client reasonably informed
in the matter is to travel to the base and meet with the client in
person. Not only is this extremely time consuming and expen-
sive, but the Protective Order requires security clearances for all
attorneys and allows only two visits before the attorney must pro-
duce a writing, signed by the client, authorizing the attorney to
represent the client.4" In addition, attorneys must notify the De-
partment of Defense at least twenty days before they plan to visit
their clients, requests made less than twenty days in advance will
41. See Hicks (Rasul) v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 2006).
42. See id. at 101-02 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), which held
that regulations that violate prisoners' Constitutional rights are valid if "reasonably re-
lated to legitimate penological interests.").
43. See, e.g., Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Privileged prisoner
mail, that is mail to or from an inmate's attorney and identified as such, may not be
opened for prisoner.") (quoting Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir.
1981)).
44. The majority of courts have held that prisoners have a general constitutional
right not to have attorney-inmate mail read. See, e.g., Kalka v. Megathlin, 10 F. Supp. 2d
1117, 1123 (D. Ariz. 1998) (listing cases).
45. This writing, called a Notification of Representation, is extremely hard to get
from the client as they are loathe to sign anything after being tricked on numerous
occasions by military officials who have made misrepresentations to them concerning
documents they are signing.
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not normally be granted. 46 At these visits, the rules concerning
outside "unnecessary" information apply, greatly restricting what
can be said to the client. With all this in mind, it is difficult to
see how the attorney can comply with the government's rules
and the rules of professional conduct simultaneously.
After the Military Commission Act of 2006, 4 7 the govern-
ment's position is that detainees no longer have a right to coun-
sel at all, as there is no longer the possibility to seek habeas relief
in the federal civilian courts.4 8 The government asserts that civil-
ian courts no longer have jurisdiction to hear detainees' claims,
so they have no need for a civilian attorney. They will be tried by
military tribunal and appointed a military defense attorney.
Contrary to the government's assertion, the detainee-clients
need and have a right to defense counsel now more than ever
for the purposes of challenging the Act 49 and representing them
before the military tribunal. While the government claims that
detainees have the right to counsel, and "can retain their own
civilian counsel,"5 ° the new regulations enacted after the Act was
signed by President Bush indicate that the military sees the Act
as a license to increase restrictions on access to the client and
prohibitions on communications to the client.51
46. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 186 (D.D.C. 2004).
47. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct.
17, 2006).
48. The Detainee Treatment Act provides that "no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider (1) an application for writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba." See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005).
49. The Act is arguably unconstitutional, potentially violating Article I, Section 9 of
the U.S. Constitution, which commands that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended unless in cases of invasion or rebellion. In fact, several suits have already
been filed by defense attorneys, some even before the law was signed. See Warren
Richey, New Lawsuits Challenge Congress' Detainee Act, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct.
6, 2006, at 1.
50. John Bellinger III, State Dept. Legal Advisor, Foreign Press Center Briefing on
the Military Commissions Act 2 (Oct. 19, 2006), available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/
74786.htm.
51. See Farah Stockman, Curb Sought on Counsel to Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25,
2006. The new regulations give a detainee challenging enemy combatant designation
one "initial" visit with counsel, and up to three "additional visits." Id.
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III. ADDITIONAL BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION: THE CULTURAL CLASH
A. Common Law Adversary System vs. Civil Law Search for Truth
The other factor complicating the representation relation-
ship is the culture clash between the attorney and client and the
client's corresponding lack of knowledge of the U.S. legal sys-
tem. While the differences between detainees and their counsel
with respect to culture, language, religion, and respective na-
tional legal institutions is a broad topic deserving of more in-
depth treatment, a few superficial observations with respect to
the effect on representation can be made. While some detainees
are from English-speaking countries,52 most are not. Many do
not speak English, and translators are needed to communicate
with attorneys. The majority of detainees are from civil law
countries, Islamic law countries, or countries using a hybrid of
these two systems: 53 they are not familiar with the common law
system. They are likewise not familiar with, and in fact are suspi-
cious of, the role of the attorney in the adversarial system. Attor-
neys have more power in our country than anywhere else in the
world.
In Tunisia, the home country of some detainees, for exam-
ple, there are fewer than 4000 lawyers54 for over ten million in-
habitants. 5 5 Compare this figure to over one million lawyers56 in
the United States, with a population of approximately 300 mil-
lion." This breaks down to roughly one attorney for every 300
people in the United States, compared with one attorney for
every 2500 people in Tunisia. Lawyers are much fewer in num-
ber, and have much less power. In Tunisia, lawyers can be and
have been arrested for making negative comments about the
52. For example, there are several detainees from Great Britain and Australia.
53. The Egyptian system is an example of this, and is emulated by other North
African countries. It uses the French-style civil law system, where there is a civil code,
but judges are supposed to interpret the civil code using Sharia law.
54. See P. LYON-CAEN, MISSIONS REPORT: TRIAL AGAINST THE BAR ASSOCIATION, Tu-
NISIA 2 (Nov. 19, 2002 - Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/Tunisia-Report-
Englisl_.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
55. See CIA, World Factbook 2006: Tunisia, available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
56. See Del Jones, Lawyers, Wannabes on the Rise, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 2003, at 5B.
57. See CIA, World Factbook 2006: United States, available at https://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
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government in court. 8 The president of the Tunisian Bar Asso-
ciation has been attacked physically by plain-clothed policemen
and has had his offices ransacked on numerous occasions.
Judge Mokhtar Yahyaoui was relieved of his duties after publish-
ing a letter condemning the lack of judicial independence from
the executive.6" After he wrote the open letter, Judge Yahyaoui's
correspondence was monitored, his chambers were ransacked,
and he was physically threatened into retracting certain state-
ments made to the foreign press.6' Faouzi Ben Mourad, a law-
yer, found himself with a four-month jail sentence for making
comments in the course of a trial that the judge considered
"anti-state. " " Human Rights lawyers regularly find their offices,
and in some cases their houses, have been broken into, their
computers and files stolen. The American Bar Association has
written two "rule of law" letters to President Ben Ali concerning
the detention of trade-union lawyer Nejib Hosni and the bur-
glary of the offices of Human Rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui.
In Tunisia, anyone accused of "terrorism" is tried by military
tribunal, not in the civilian courts; clients are therefore confused
and disbelieving that they would have access to the federal
courts, and that a lawyer can talk negatively about the govern-
ment's policies. It is hard for some detainee clients to under-
stand that a lawyer is allowed to represent them against the gov-
ernment, and in a civilian court, and free of charge.
Imagine being escorted into a room; imagine being es-
corted by an armed guard; imagine you are meeting for the first
time a man chained to the floor; imagine that you and the man
both know that the entire interview is being filmed; imagine that
he is a poor man from Tunisia; and then imagine trying to ex-
plain to him what you can do for him and why he should trust
you.
58. See Human Rights First, Tunisian Judge Blows Whistle on Judicial Tampering,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/middleeast/tunisia/hrd-tun- .htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2007).
59. See LYoN-CAEN, supra note 54, at 4.
60. See Human Rights First, supra note 58.
61. See id.
62. See RohanJayasekera, President Tells Nation's Lawyers-My Word is Law, INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP, May 8, 2005, available at http://www.indexonline.org/en/news/articles/
2005/2/tunisia-president-tells-nation-s-lawyers-my-.shtml.
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B. Detainee's Capacity to Participate in His Legal Decisions
The Model Rules require that the lawyer "abide by the cli-
ent's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued. '6 3 Aside from the government-imposed communica-
tion restrictions discussed above, the language and culture barri-
ers facing the attorney and client make this rule impossible to
follow. Given the differences between the common law systems
and the civil law and Islamic law systems, combined with the cli-
ent's condition of confinement, the extremely restricted access
to the client, the client's lack of knowledge concerning the legal
system, and the already extended duration of detainment of the
client, how should the Model Rule be applied? How could such
a client be able to determine the best legal route? What should
the attorney do?
One answer might be Model Rule 1.14, which applies when
"a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished, whether be-
cause of minority, mental impairment, or some other reason."64
The lawyer in this relationship may take protective action on be-
half of the client, such as seeking a guardian ad litem, but is not
required to do so. If not seeking a guardian, the lawyer is ad-
vised to maintain the relationship as normally as possible, but
paternalism is accepted and expected. In other words, "if the
client lacks a guardian or legal representative, the lawyer may be
called upon to determine if her client is sufficiently incompetent
or incapacitated to justify her taking over as de facto guardian."65
The issue of incapacity may be very real for many detainees.
There is mental illness in Guantanamo Bay. The long period of
detention without access to the judicial process combined with
long periods of solitary confinement, questionable interrogation
tactics, unsanitary conditions, cultural and religious harassment,
and long separation from family have led to serious mental
health consequences.66
The conditions of confinement have taken such a toll that
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2(a).
64. Id. R. 1.14(a).
65. Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules
Say and Don't Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 241, 244 (1998).
66. See U.N. Report, supra note 31, at 11 70-71.
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in 2003 alone there were 350 acts of self-harm, mass suicide at-
tempts, and widespread hunger strikes resulting in force-feed-
ing.17 Detainees who have been subjected to such conditions
and tactics for many years may not be in a position to make ra-
tional decisions concerning their representation in a foreign le-
gal system.
The Protective Order requires that each client authorize
their attorney to act on their behalf by executing a Notification
of Representation which must be signed by the client and filed
with the court having jurisdiction.6" This procedure is not usu-
ally required when the client is perfectly competent. The De-
partment of Defense first tried to block attorney access alto-
gether by saying that the Protective Order required the Notifica-
tion of Representation to be executed before allowing any access
to the detainee.69 This interpretation did not survive judicial
analysis,7 ° but the government now insists that counsel show au-
thorization to meet with their client after two visits and in some
cases, even after the Protective Order, the government has con-
tinued to deny counsel access at all until authorization is
shown. 7' Detainees are loathe to sign the Notification of Repre-
sentation because they do not know exactly what they are signing
and are afraid it will be used against them; they are suspicious of
their attorneys because Guantanamo interrogators have often
posed as their attorneys to elicit information from them.7" They
have also been told by officials at Guantanamo that anything
they say to their attorneys can be used against them. In this re-
spect, the Notification of Representation acts as an unnecessary
roadblock to representation.
CONCLUSION
The actions of the cause lawyers of the 1960s and the ac-
tions of lawyers representing detainees in Guantanamo Bay are
67. See PHYSICIANS FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE OF Psy-
CHOLOGICAL TORTURE 52-53 (2005), http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/
documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
68. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185 (D.D.C. 2004).
69. See Respondent's Opposition, Doe v. Bush, No. 05-CV-1704 (D.D.C. 2005).
70. See Memorandum Order, Doe, No. 05-CV-1704.
71. First Declaration of George Daly andJeffreyJ. Davis at 1, AI-Harbi v. Bush, No.
1:05-CV-01857 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
72. See Eliza Griswold, American Gulag: Prisoners' Tales from the War of Terror,
HARPER'S BAZAAR, Sept. 1, 2006, at 41-43.
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very similar. The factors driving these actions are likewise simi-
lar, that is, frustration at the inability of traditional law practices
to help one's client. The difference is the cause. While both
represent groups that are unpopular, radical leftist groups in the
1960s and religious extremists in Guantanamo, the lawyers in the
1960s were seen as embodying the cause they represented, while
the law firms representing detainees are seen as upholding the
rule of law. The client-centered approach has proved problem-
atic in both cases, and in Guantanamo paternalism is universally
applied. Paternalism is necessary due to the restrictions put on
the attorney-client relationship by government restrictions and
the incapacitation of the client. Rule 1.14 recognizes the neces-
sity of paternalism in these circumstances.
